Economics and Public Finance Bills

Unauthorized Spending Accountability Act

Sponsored by Kat Cammack

Congress regularly appropriates funds for federal programs even after their statutory authorizations expire. Currently, there is no automatic mechanism to reduce or eliminate funding for these unauthorized programs. Instead, they continue to receive appropriations year after year through the normal budget process, sometimes for decades after their original authorization lapsed. This creates a disconnect between congressional intent—expressed through time-limited authorizations—and actual spending, allowing programs to persist indefinitely without explicit reapproval. The Unauthorized Spending Accountability Act establishes an automatic three-year reduction schedule for any program whose authorization has expired. Beginning in fiscal year 2026, the House and Senate Budget Committees must reduce the budgetary allocation for unauthorized programs by 10 percent in the first year following expiration, then by 15 percent in the second and third years following expiration. The Congressional Budget Office's annual "Expired and Expiring Authorizations of Appropriations" report identifies which programs trigger these reductions. Congress can avoid these cuts by reauthorizing a program with a sunset provision limiting the authorization period to no more than three years. If an unauthorized program remains unfunded after three years of reductions, it terminates automatically on October 1 of the fourth year following expiration. Any unobligated funds may still be used to settle existing obligations, but no new spending is permitted without explicit congressional reauthorization. The reduction schedule applies to programs that expired before 2026 as well, treating them as if they expire in 2026 for purposes of the three-year cycle. This creates ongoing pressure on Congress to actively reauthorize programs rather than allowing them to continue on autopilot, fundamentally shifting the default from indefinite funding to time-limited authorization.

Sponsored by Jodey Arrington

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), administered by the Department of Agriculture, currently provides food assistance to low-income households based on income thresholds and asset limits. Work requirements for able-bodied adults without dependents exist but contain exemptions and time limits. The program's benefit levels are calculated using the Thrifty Food Plan, a USDA model of minimum nutritional adequacy. Current law allows certain utility costs to be deducted from income when determining eligibility, and states can request waivers from federal work requirements under specific conditions. The program also permits internet and phone expenses as allowable costs in some circumstances. H.R. 1 directs the Department of Agriculture to re-evaluate the Thrifty Food Plan methodology and adjust SNAP benefit calculations accordingly. The bill modifies work requirements for able-bodied adults by restricting exemptions and reducing time-limit waivers that states may request. It eliminates the standard utility allowance deduction in most cases, requiring households to document actual energy assistance receipt to claim deductions. The bill prohibits SNAP funds from covering internet and phone expenses. Additionally, it increases the matching funds states must contribute to administer SNAP and raises the share of administrative costs states must bear, shifting more financial responsibility to state budgets. These changes take effect at varying dates, with some provisions applying to the next fiscal year and others phased in over time. The bill provides no new federal funding to offset state cost-sharing increases, meaning states must redirect existing resources or reduce other programs. The re-evaluation of the Thrifty Food Plan could lower benefit amounts if the new methodology determines lower nutritional costs. Stricter work requirements and reduced utility deductions will narrow eligibility or reduce benefits for some households. States with high energy costs or significant populations of working poor may face particular budget pressures from increased matching requirements.

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting the United States Government from increasing its debt except for a specific purpose by law adopted by three-fourths of the membership of each House of Congress.

Sponsored by Tom McClintock

Currently, the federal government can increase the national debt through ordinary legislation requiring only a simple majority vote in each chamber of Congress. The debt ceiling—a statutory limit on total borrowing—has been raised dozens of times since its creation in 1917, typically through standard legislative procedures. When the government approaches the ceiling, Congress passes a new law to raise it, often as part of broader spending or budget negotiations. This process has become routine, though it occasionally triggers political standoffs that threaten government operations and financial markets. This joint resolution proposes a constitutional amendment that would fundamentally alter how the federal government borrows money. The amendment requires that any increase to the national debt be authorized only through legislation approved by three-fourths of the membership in both the House of Representatives and the Senate—a supermajority far exceeding the simple majority currently needed. The proposal contains two sections: the first establishes the new debt-increase requirement, and the second delays implementation for ten years after ratification, allowing time for transition. If ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures, this amendment would take effect a decade later, reshaping federal fiscal authority. Future debt increases would require supermajority support, making it substantially harder to raise the borrowing limit. The amendment creates no new funding mechanism or agency; instead, it restructures the constitutional threshold for debt authorization. The ten-year delay provides a window before the stricter rule applies, though Congress would need to plan accordingly. This change would likely affect how the government finances operations, responds to emergencies, and manages long-term obligations, potentially requiring earlier or more frequent debt-ceiling negotiations.

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to balancing the budget.

Sponsored by Vern Buchanan

Currently, the U.S. Constitution does not mandate that the federal government balance its budget each fiscal year. The President proposes a budget, and Congress approves it through legislation. There is no constitutional requirement for Congress to balance the budget, and it can increase the national debt limit without a supermajority. This bill proposes an amendment to the Constitution to require that total outlays for any fiscal year do not exceed total receipts unless two-thirds of Congress approves a specific excess by a rollcall vote. It also sets a cap of 18 percent of the gross domestic product for total outlays, with similar supermajority requirements for exceeding this limit. The President must submit a budget that meets these criteria. Additionally, any bill imposing a new tax or increasing existing taxes requires a two-thirds majority in Congress. The debt limit cannot be increased without a three-fifths majority. Congress can waive these provisions during wartime or serious military threats with a majority vote. In practice, this amendment would require Congress to vote on any budget that exceeds the outlined limits, potentially leading to more stringent fiscal discipline. The President would need to submit balanced budgets or justify any deficits with a two-thirds congressional approval. Tax increases would become more challenging, and the debt limit would require broader congressional support. Courts would be barred from ordering revenue increases to enforce these provisions. This amendment would take effect five fiscal years after ratification.

Inaction Has Consequences Act

Sponsored by Robert Wittman

Congress must pass twelve regular appropriation bills each fiscal year to fund federal agencies and programs. Currently, when Congress fails to meet this deadline, it typically passes a continuing resolution—a temporary spending measure that extends previous funding levels—allowing government operations to continue while negotiations proceed. Members of Congress continue receiving their salaries throughout these delays. This practice has become increasingly common, with Congress relying on continuing resolutions rather than completing the full appropriations process on schedule. The Inaction Has Consequences Act requires the payroll administrator of each chamber—the Chief Administrative Officer of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate—to deposit all congressional salaries into escrow accounts if that chamber has not passed all twelve regular appropriation bills by the first day of the fiscal year. Members' salaries remain held in escrow from October 1st until either the chamber passes all appropriation bills or the Congress ends, whichever comes first. The bill directs the Secretary of the Treasury to assist payroll administrators in implementing the escrow system. Tax withholdings and other deductions continue as normal on the held amounts. Implementation begins with fiscal year 2026. If either chamber fails to pass all appropriation bills by October 1st, salaries are immediately diverted to escrow. Members receive their withheld compensation only after all bills pass or when their term ends. The bill includes a safeguard ensuring that any remaining escrow funds are released by the last day of Congress, addressing constitutional concerns about compensation changes mid-term. No new funding is required; the mechanism simply redirects existing salary payments. The downstream effect is intended to create pressure on Congress to complete appropriations work on schedule rather than relying on continuing resolutions.

Proposing a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Sponsored by Zachary Nunn

The federal government currently operates without a constitutional requirement to balance its budget. Congress can spend more money than it collects in revenue by borrowing, and the national debt has grown substantially over decades. While Congress has imposed statutory debt limits and budget rules on itself, these can be changed by simple legislation and have not prevented sustained deficits. The Treasury Department manages federal borrowing to cover shortfalls, but no constitutional mechanism requires spending and revenue to align. This joint resolution proposes a constitutional amendment that would require the federal government to balance its budget each fiscal year. The amendment mandates that total outlays cannot exceed total receipts unless three-fifths of both the House and Senate vote to approve a specific deficit by rollcall vote. Additionally, the President would be required to submit a balanced budget proposal to Congress each year. The amendment also prohibits revenue increases without a majority vote in both chambers and allows Congress to borrow to repay existing debt principal, though not to finance new spending. Waivers are permitted during declared wars or military conflicts posing imminent threats to national security, approved by majority vote in both chambers. If ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures within seven years, the amendment would take effect beginning in the fifth fiscal year after ratification. Congress would enforce the amendment through legislation that may rely on budget estimates rather than final figures. The change would fundamentally alter federal fiscal operations: Congress would face hard choices between raising revenue, cutting spending, or invoking the three-fifths supermajority exception to run deficits. Existing mandatory spending programs like Social Security and Medicare, discretionary defense and domestic spending, and tax policy would all become subject to this constraint. The amendment would not affect the Treasury Department's debt management but would restrict its ability to borrow for operational deficits.

Budget Process Enhancement Act

Sponsored by Andy Biggs

Under current law, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 establishes a baseline for measuring federal spending changes. This baseline includes an automatic adjustment for inflation when projecting future spending levels. The baseline methodology also allows for adjustments based on various economic factors. These adjustments are used by Congress and the Office of Management and Budget to evaluate whether proposed spending increases or decreases relative to the baseline, which affects how budget rules and spending caps are applied across the federal government. This bill amends the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act to remove the inflation adjustment from the baseline calculation. The bill directs the Office of Management and Budget to eliminate the automatic inflation factor when establishing spending baselines, and prohibits any adjustments for inflation or other economic factors going forward. This means future spending projections will be calculated without accounting for price increases, making it appear that spending has grown even when it merely keeps pace with inflation. The change takes effect immediately upon enactment. By removing inflation adjustments, the baseline will show larger apparent spending increases, which could trigger stricter budget enforcement mechanisms and make it harder for Congress to maintain current service levels without appearing to exceed spending targets. The Office of Management and Budget will implement this new baseline methodology in its budget scoring and analysis. Additionally, the bill establishes that if either chamber of Congress fails to agree on a budget resolution by April 15, 2025, members' salaries will be held in escrow until a budget is passed or the congressional session ends, and it requires the Inspector General of the Office of Personnel Management to verify whether the President submits the budget on time, with pay withheld from Office of Management and Budget leadership during any noncompliance period.

.Proposing a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution requiring that each agency and department's funding is justified.

Sponsored by Scott Perry

The federal government currently operates without a constitutional requirement to balance its budget. Congress may spend more than it collects in revenue in any given year, and the national debt limit can be raised through simple majority votes in both chambers. While various laws govern budget procedures and deficit spending, no constitutional mandate requires that total federal outlays match total receipts, nor do existing rules systematically require agencies to justify their funding requests against their core missions or potential reductions. This joint resolution proposes a constitutional amendment that would require the President to submit a balanced budget to Congress each fiscal year, with limited exceptions. The amendment establishes a spending cap beginning at 20 percent of estimated gross domestic product, declining by 0.1 percentage point annually until reaching a floor of 16 percent of GDP. Congress could exceed this cap or increase the national debt only through three-fifths supermajority votes in both chambers. Additionally, the amendment requires each federal department and agency to justify all proposed funding by explaining how each line item supports its mission, its effect on GDP, and an alternative funding level that would allow the agency to complete critical functions. Revenue increases would also require three-fifths majorities in both chambers. The amendment would take effect either ten years after ratification or immediately after the first fiscal year in which the budget is not in deficit, whichever comes first. Congress could waive the balanced budget requirement during declared wars, military conflicts posing imminent threats to national security, or declared natural disasters, each requiring two-thirds approval in both chambers. Implementation would rely on congressional estimates of revenues and outlays. The amendment would fundamentally reshape federal budgeting by constraining total spending growth, requiring detailed justification of agency budgets, and raising the legislative threshold for deficit spending and debt increases from simple majorities to supermajorities.

Proposing a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Sponsored by Andy Biggs

Currently, the U.S. Constitution does not require the federal government to balance its budget each fiscal year. The federal government can run deficits, borrowing money to cover expenses that exceed revenues. This practice allows for flexibility in managing economic cycles and funding major initiatives but can also lead to accumulating national debt. This bill proposes an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would require the federal government to balance its budget annually. The Department of the Treasury would be responsible for ensuring that total outlays do not exceed total receipts for any fiscal year. Additionally, the bill prohibits increasing the public debt limit and requires any bill to increase revenue to be approved by a two-thirds majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. In practice, if this amendment is ratified, the federal government would need to adjust its spending and revenue strategies to avoid deficits. This could mean cutting spending, increasing taxes, or a combination of both. The amendment would also require significant changes in legislative processes, as revenue-increasing bills would need broader support to pass. Over time, this could lead to a more disciplined approach to federal finances, potentially reducing the national debt and influencing economic policy.

Proposing a Federal debt limit amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Sponsored by Rudy Yakym

The federal government currently operates under a statutory debt ceiling set by Congress, which must be raised through separate legislation whenever the Treasury approaches the limit. This mechanism has created recurring fiscal crises, with Congress periodically voting to increase the ceiling to prevent default. The current system allows total federal debt to grow without a constitutional constraint, and lawmakers have repeatedly suspended or raised the ceiling to accommodate spending and revenue decisions made through the regular budget process. This bill proposes a constitutional amendment that would establish a permanent debt limit tied to the nation's economic output. The amendment requires total federal debt—including both publicly held debt and intragovernmental obligations—to not exceed 130 percent of Gross Domestic Product in the first fiscal year the amendment takes effect, then decline by 1 percentage point annually until reaching 120 percent of GDP, where it would remain permanently. Congress could exceed this limit only through a three-fifths supermajority vote in both chambers for specified reasons each fiscal year. The President would be required to submit budgets that comply with the debt limit for the current year and the following five years. The amendment would take effect three fiscal years after ratification, requiring 38 states to approve it within seven years. Congress retains authority to waive the debt limit during declared wars or military conflicts posing imminent threats to national security, provided a joint resolution passes by majority vote identifying the specific excess needed. The Gross Domestic Product calculation would be determined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Implementation would rely on estimates of federal spending and revenues, and Congress would enact legislation to enforce the amendment's provisions. The change would fundamentally alter how the federal government manages deficits and spending decisions.

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to provide for balanced budgets for the Government.

Sponsored by Brian Fitzpatrick

The federal government currently operates without a constitutional requirement to balance its budget. Congress passes annual spending bills that frequently exceed revenues collected through taxes and other sources, resulting in deficit spending. While various laws require the President to submit balanced budget proposals and Congress to consider deficit reduction, these requirements lack constitutional force and are routinely overridden through legislative action. The government has run deficits in most years since the 1960s, accumulating a national debt exceeding $33 trillion. This joint resolution proposes a constitutional amendment requiring total federal spending to not exceed total revenues in any fiscal year, unless Congress approves the excess by a two-thirds supermajority vote in both chambers through rollcall voting. The President would be required to submit a balanced budget proposal to Congress each year. The amendment includes three narrow exceptions: Congress may waive the requirement during declared wars by rollcall vote, during declared national emergencies by majority vote through joint resolution, or during declared natural disasters by majority vote through joint resolution. Congress retains authority to enforce the amendment through legislation, which may rely on estimates of spending and revenues rather than final accounting. The amendment would take effect beginning with the fifth fiscal year after ratification by three-fourths of state legislatures—a process that typically requires several years. Implementation would require Congress to either reduce spending, increase revenues, or invoke one of the three exceptions for any year projected to run a deficit. The amendment does not specify enforcement mechanisms or penalties for violations beyond the constitutional requirement itself. Downstream effects would likely include pressure to restructure entitlement programs, defense spending, and tax policy, though the supermajority requirement and emergency exceptions provide flexibility for responding to economic crises or military needs.

No Budget, No Pay Act

Sponsored by Robert Wittman

Under current law, Congress must adopt a concurrent budget resolution by April 15 each fiscal year under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. This resolution serves as a blueprint for federal spending and revenue, guiding subsequent appropriations decisions. However, Congress has frequently missed this deadline without facing consequences. Members continue to receive their salaries regardless of whether a budget resolution has been agreed upon, creating little incentive to meet the statutory deadline. This pattern has persisted for decades, with budget resolutions often delayed by months or abandoned entirely in favor of continuing resolutions that extend prior-year spending levels. The No Budget, No Pay Act requires the Chief Administrative Officer of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate to hold all congressional salaries in escrow beginning April 16 if their respective chamber has not adopted a concurrent budget resolution for the next fiscal year. The payroll administrator of each house must deposit compensation payments into an escrow account rather than distributing them to members. Salaries remain withheld until either the chamber agrees to a budget resolution or the congressional session ends, whichever comes first. The Department of the Treasury provides administrative support to implement the escrow mechanism. Delegates and Resident Commissioners are treated as members for purposes of salary withholding. The escrow arrangement takes effect for fiscal year 2026 and applies to all subsequent fiscal years. Withheld salaries are released either upon passage of a budget resolution or automatically on the final day of the congressional session, ensuring members ultimately receive all compensation owed. Tax withholding and remittance procedures apply to escrowed payments as if they were distributed normally. The mechanism creates a direct financial incentive for members to prioritize budget resolution passage by the April 15 deadline, potentially accelerating the legislative process for this foundational budget document.